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Between 1937 and 1996 all aspects of maize marketing in South Africa were controlled by the Maize 
Board. Their pre-planting price simultaneously reduced price risk and provided a price discovery 
service. Since the Maize Board's withdrawal in 1996, these services are said to have been provided 
for farmers by the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) (UNCT AD, 2007). This paper aims to 
test the claim theoretically and empirically. If this claim is true then policy makers hoping to improve 
the income security of poorer farmers can be confident that SAFEX is a sufficient tool to achieve this 
goal, rendering regulation unnecessary. 
Methodologically, the study is rooted in an earlier paper by Chavas and Holt (1990), which derived a 
general acreage response function from the maximisation of farm household expected utility. Their 
model estimates the optimal acreage function using aggregate data for two crops in the presence of 
uncertainty. This paper extends the Chavas and Holt (1990) approach by allowing for a futures market 
and farm heterogeneity, and by distinguishing between yield and price variance. While we develop 
our theoretical model for several crops, our econometric model is for maize only. We then estimate 
this model using a panel consisting of aggregate provincial-level data over the period 1971-2008. 
We use this model to answer three questions. 
i) Are South African maize farmers risk averse and, if so, do they exhibit decreasing aggregate 
risk aversion (DARA)? 
ii) Have farmers' acreage responses to expected prices changed since the withdrawal of the 
Maize Board? 
iii) Has farmers' ability to manage price risk changed since the withdrawal of the Maize Board? 
The answers to these questions allow insight into the effects of local agriculture's transition from 
regulation to a free-market system and into the income security of farmers. 
While earlier research has used survey data to analyse the behaviour of South African maize farmers 










Woolverton and Sky uta, 2009), it has not compared the use and effectiveness of these instruments to 
the services offered by the Maize Board. Longitudinal survey data over the period of interest is not 
available, but the use of a panel across South African regions can help us to understand the changing 
behaviour of farmers over time while also accounting for certain farmer heterogeneities. To our 
knowledge an acreage response model has never included the option of futures markets or been 
estimated using panel data. 
Our analysis indicates that farmers are risk averse and display significant positive wealth effects, 
which are necessary, but not sufficient for DARA preferences. In other words. the decisions made by 
wealthy farmers are less susceptible to risk than those of poor ones. 
With respect to price discovery, there is little firm evidence to suggest that farmers respond positively 
to higher expected prices, whether established by the "voorskot" under the Maize Board or the futures 
price after its withdrawal. 
In terms of price risk management, however, we are confident that SAFEX has allowed for farmers to 
deal with increased price volatility subsequent to the withdrawal of the Maize Board. However, we 
find that yield risk has at least as significant an impact on farmers' decisions as price risk. 
We create perspective for our analysis by describing the background of the Maize Board. its 
operations. and the subsequent introduction of SAFEX. We then review the literature on price 
discovery and price risk management in agriculture in the context of uncertainty. With this literature 
in mind, we develop a theoretical and econometric model, which is used to address the three questions 
posed earlier. After estimating this model, we conclude by suggesting some policy implications 












Despite a difficult start to the 20th century with the recovery from the Boer War and the internal unrest 
in 1914115, South Africa's agricultural production rose steadily after World War 1. However, prices 
were unstable (particularly those of wheat and maize), marketing was disorderly and the depression 
brought on a lack of credit. Some even argued that farming in South Africa had degenerated into 
RauberwirtschaJt (Houghton, 1973: 58). Producers blamed inadequate marketing infrastructure and 
speculators, and argued for co-operative societies as a solution (De Swardt, 1983: 5). 
Co-operatives for various farm products existed in some parts of the country, but not at a national 
scale. In 1922, however, the Co-operative Act was passed, allowing for government supervision and 
guidance in the establishment and running of co-operatives. Farmers were now offered a pre-planting 
price or "voorskot ", while larger producers could still try to negotiate a better price by negotiating 
directly with the millers and exporters and delivering directly to elevators. Co-operatives grew and 
expanded, while Land Bank financing allowed for improvements in marketing infrastructure. This 
was a period of high expectations for co-operatives as a solution to market instability (De Swardt, 
1983: 5-10). 
While the system worked reasonably in normal times, it came under pressure when the Great 
Depression began and prices dropped. Co-operatives were forced to buy up increasing volumes of 
maize until, by 1933, they were handling sixty per cent of the amount marketed (De Swardt, 1983: 
10). The perverse effects of such a policy are epitomised by the fact that a larger crop actually resulted 
in a higher domestic price since a levy on domestic prices was used to finance the losses incurred 
from exporting at a price below cost to get rid of surpluses (Houghton. 1973: 51). 
In 1933 a commission of enquiry was appointed to investigate the feasibility of "one-channel" 
"orderly marketing" (De Swardt, 1983: 13). The conclusion of this enquiry was, "No board of 
control, therefore, however efficiently managed, can hope to attain any degree of success by ignoring 











can hope to achieve better results than the competitive system which embraces numerous individual 
units representing both producers and consumers" (De Swardt, 1983: 14). 
Economists of the time also argued that the financial resources needed by agriculture could be more 
profitably spent on other industries such as mining, and that benefits to farmers were a burden to the 
rest of the economy (De Kiewiet, 1957: 259-260). The Maize Board would inevitably have to secure 
farmer incomes via contrived scarcity rather than increasing the efficiency of the sector via 
improvements in technology (Houghton, 1973: 59). 
The counterargument was that current mineral wealth was transitory, while the land's fertility would 
be permanent. Some policy makers consequently argued that agriculture needed to be developed for 
the long-term sustainability of the South African economy (De Kiewiet, 1957: 248-253). It was also 
believed that central planning was the only way to "prevail against isolation and inertia. disease and 
drought. against ignorance and inefficiency" (De Kiewiet, 1957: 252). 
Given that the government was politically predisposed to help farmers in economic distress, it was 
thought to be wise to establish permanent and specialised bodies to "prevent rather than cure" (De 
Swardt, 1983: 18). In a complete turnaround from the conclusions of the 1933 commission of 
enquiry, the 1937 the Marketing Bill was enacted. The role of price discovery and price risk 
management was thereafter performed by a panel of experts using the tools and information at their 
disposal to determine prices with the aim of ensuring stability in agriculture. 
Use of the "voorskot" as a price risk management and price discovery mechanism is essentially the 
same system that the co-operatives used; the fundamental difference being that farmers could now 
only sell through the Maize Board (De Swardt, 1983: II). They could, therefore, make their planting 
decisions with a worse-case scenario (with respect to prices) in mind. The introduction of disaster 
relief meant that farmers were also less exposed to the risk of crop failure (Vink and Kirsten, 2000). 
The Maize Board's "v()orskot" managed to stabilise prices, but at a level much higher than the world 
price (Houghton, 1973: 60). Surpluses therefore needed to be exported at a loss, meaning that the 











Marketing Act was that it was merely allowing for an unsustainably high level of income for farmers 
without making any real improvements I (Pringle, 1980: 386). The effect of this was not only 
inefficiency, but a lack of healthy farming practices, meaning that the inflated price offered by the 
Maize Board could have severe longer term effects (Houghton. 1973: 61). 
While domestic consumption increased steadily after World War II, the Maize Board's task of 
equating demand and supply by establishing the "right" price involved many difficulties, especially 
due to climatic variations (Houghton, 1973: 52). So we can see that price control in and of itself is 
not sufficient to create stability if yield variability is not given a similar amount of attention. 
Furthermore. we can summarise the last three paragraphs by stating that the Maize Board did not 
necessarily attempt to set the price at the equilibrium level and any attempt to do so was made 
difficult by factors out of their control. 
From 1987, the Maize Board could no longer rely on government support (Kirsten et aI, 1994: 35) and 
the pricing of maize changed to a single-channel pooling scheme where prices are determined in 
domestic markets as the difference between the Maize Board's operating costs and its sales revenue. 
This meant that the export loss burden was not so large (Jayne et al. 1995: 4). This was the first 
obvious policy change on the road to complete deregulation. Later. with political change in South 
Africa and, hence, the need for a rethink of the support that had previously been given to white 
commercial agricultural and the evolution of the free-market sentiments being pushed by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it was decided to deregulate agriculture and leave prices to 
be dictated by market forces. Single-channel pricing was abolished in 1995 (Vink and Kirsten, 2000: 
35). 
The looming deregulation of the agricultural sector developed an increasing interest in commodity 
derivative trading in South Africa and in 1995 the Agricultural Markets Division (AMD) was set-up 
as an independent part of SAFEX (which had been trading equity derivatives since 1987) (Gravelet-
Blondin, 2001: 15). In 2001 SAFEX became part of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and was 
1 Pringle (1980: 384) notes that there is evidence to suggest that approximately eighty percent of maize farming 











renamed the Agricultural Products Division (APD) of the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa 
(SAFEX, 2009: I). 
SAFEX's (and, hence, the APD's) mission is "to provide the secure and efficient market for trading 
derivatives in South Africa" (Gravelet-Blondin, 200 I: 20). There is nothing said about helping 
farmers or price stability or following the fundamentals of the market. To claim that SAFEX is "not 
doing what it is supposed to" would be unfounded since it was established in response to the 
opportunity created by deregulation and not as a replacement for regulation. This does not mean, 
however, that SAFEX does not or cannot fulfill some of the Maize Board's former functions. 
UNCT AD (2007) claims that among SAFEX's functions are, prIce risk management and price 
discovery. They tested these two functions using 22 claims. The ones relevant to our study with 
respect to price discovery that came out positive are that there is a good alignment of spot and futures 
markets and prices reflect the fundamentals of the domestic industry. The specific aspects of price 
discovery where UNCTAD (2007) believe SAFEX has failed are in the avoidance of shortages and 
gluts, improved prices from intermediaries, the "squee::ing out" of rent-seeking intermediaries from 
the supply chain, and reduction in inter- and intra-seasonal price volatility2. UNCTAD (2007) could 
not establish whether or not the market allows farmers to increase income by making cropping 
decisions based on futures prices. With respect to price risk management, SAFEX was deemed 
successful as a shield against serious losses when prices fail and in facilitating more effective 
planning and investment. 
2 UNCT AD (2007) mention this last point with respect to price discovery although it seems obvious that this is 











III Literature Review 
It is \vell established that a risk averse farmer tacing uncertainty about output and/or prices will 
produce less than he would if these h1ctors were certain or he was risl-. neutral (Sandmo, 1971). 
Similarly. Cheung (1970) and Stiglitz (1974) show th'1t a reduction in risk results in an increase in 
output. Just and 7ilberman (1986) show that a downward sloping supply curve is possible under 
uncertainty. Ozanne (1998) attempts to empirically test the hypothesis of perverse supply raised 
earl ier by Schultz (1960) and developed by Baron (1970). This hypothesis states that the classical 
production theory result of an increase in output price increasing the output supplied by a firm may 
not be valid under uncertainty if increases in output prices are accompanied by an increase in 
variance. Ozanne's (1998) findings do not support perverse supply response. but do indicate the 
importance of accounting for risk in supply response models. 
Just and 7ilberman (1986) show that, in the presence of production risk, reducing or managing price 
risk is not sufficient to account for lower supply due to uncertainty. Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) 
also argue on two counts that a reduction in price risk is not sufficient to attain income stability. 
Firstly. givcn that price and yield disturbances are multiplicative. price stabilisation should be 
conditioned on yields'. Secondly, stabilisation schemes may actually alter mean prices rather than 
just vari ances. 
Before continuing. we need to establish how risk enters into agents' decisions. Arrow (1971) defines 
b I . 1 • (/(Y) I Y b' d . - V1i'I'1 I' I' j' a so ute nsi\. averSiOn as - -, -. 'IV 1ere can e l11terprete as uncertaIn profl1. 11 e t 11S app les or 
U (Y) 
any monotonic transformation of the utility function. dill'erences in preferences will result in 
differences ill risk averseness and, as we will continue to argue, differences in behaviour. 
Any analysis of risk \vill, therefore, depend on the utility function assumed. Researchers (Coyle, 
1992; Coyle. 1999; Vukina and Holthausen, 1996; Simmons, 2002; Pannell et aI, 2008; Woolverton 
and Sk)uta. 2009) have used a mean-variance certainty equivalent of profit , .... ith a constant absolute 












risk aversion (CARA) utility function to analyse the behaviour of fanners under uncertainty. While 
this approach allows for models from which quite explicit conclusions can be drawn, the CARA 
assumption is quite restrictive since it only applies to situations with normal distributions and 
quadratic utility functions (Kroll el al. 1984: 47). 
Arrow (1971) argues that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth. Not restricting ourselves to 
CARA then seems to increase realism and allows us to test empirically whether behaviour exhibits 
CARA. DARA or even increasing absolute risk aversion (1 A RA). Since non-CARA preferences 
cause some of the results of neoclassical production theory to break down under uncertainty, we will 
look at the effects of [)ARA on both a theoretical model of acreage response and our empirical 
analysis. Establishing whether f~\rmers exhihit DARA or not will also help us to understand 1:1rmers' 
reactions to risk as well as inform policy aiming to manage risk. 
Commodity stabilisation programs (such as the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs)) 
recognised the role of risk in agriculture and attempted to implement policies and international 
agreements to mitigate it. While there was extensive debate on this issue, recent (post 1985) 
consensus has been that these programs were a failure and that market instruments offer more promise 
as tools to counteract risk (Gilbert, 1995). 
This consensus allowed futures markets to emerge as an alternative to commodity price stabilisation 
schemes. This made analyses of factors determining farmers' decisions to use hedging instruments 
pertinent. 
Mahul (2002) finds that hedging through the use of options is a substitute for crop revenue insurance, 
but a complement for crop yield insurance. These results are consistent with those of Coble et af 
(2000) who present futures as a hedging instrument. This again brings up the link between 
production uncertainty and price uncertainty. Accounting for price risk cannot reduce income risk 
entirely without the help of some form of instrument to reduce production risk. 
McKinnon (1967) also emphasises the fact that income variance is dependent on both price and 











other depends on the elasticity of the market demand curve. If the market demand curve is elastic, a 
decline in production will not increase the price as much as if the demand curve were inelastic. This 
means that producers operating in a market with an elastic demand curve will be given no reprieve 
from production risk by a corresponding increase in prices. 
A point that McKinnon (1967) makes even more strongly is that commodity stabilisation policies 
should not focus on spot prices, but rather on long-term futures prices since these allow farmers 
sufficient security to make planting decisions, while not distorting these decisions. McKinnon's 
concept would have been applicable to the Maize Board's operations even though he was dealing with 
global commodity price stability, whereas they were only concerned with South African farmers. The 
Maize Board's "voorskot" meant some stabilisation of spot prices even though it was decided upon 
prior to planting. 
Recent attempts to model the optimal hedging decisions of farmers have been less concerned with 
commodity price stability. Building on McKinnon's (1967) theoretical model, they attempt to explain 
why the actual behaviours of farmer deviate from those predicted by their respective models. 
Most of these analyses use survey data from interviews with farmers, perhaps due to the influence of 
behavioural economics' analyses of research validity (Roe and Just, 2009). 
Maximising a mean-variance certainty equivalent of profit function, Pannell et al (2008) find that the 
optimal hedge ratio decreases with increases in transaction costs and basis risk. The optimal hedge 
also decreases as production fluctuations increase, in line with the intuition given earlier by 
McKinnon (1967). The basic idea remains that while hedging can reduce price risk, production risk 
needs to be mitigated in some other way, especially when producers face near perfect competition. 
For example, if price elasticity is one, then a percentage change in production is exactly balanced by a 
percentage change in price and, hence, revenue is unchanged. The further elasticity deviates from one, 
the more extreme the effect of output changes on revenue and vice versa. 
Pannell et at (2008) then use the data collected from their survey to analyse how this optimal decision 











expectations equal to the futures price, the optimal hedge is 100% of expected output irrespective of 
risk aversion. They then find that basis risk, transactions costs and production uncertainty have, at 
best, a moderate effect on hedging decisions. What can have a more dramatic effect, however, are the 
different expectations between farmers of the future spot price, which Pannell et at (2008) find to be 
quite significant. They conclude from this that futures markets are used by Australian farmers to 
increase profits (speculate) rather than to reduce risk (hedge). 
This demonstrates the importance of accurate price discovery, but also exposes that it is realistically 
unattainable. Hayek (1945) and, more formally, Grossman and Stiglitz (1989) argue that 
informational efficiency will never be perfect, which allows for the differences in expected prices and 
speculative profits to be made. We will look, theoretically and empirically, at how farmers respond to 
expected prices. 
Comparing South African and US maize farmers, Woolverton and Skyuta (2009) observe that farmers 
in the USA aided by income support programs hedge 20% to 30% less than South African farmers. 
Importantly, they find that South African farmers make their price risk management decisions prior to 
planting, whereas US farmers split theirs, making them initially prior to planting and again prior to 
harvesting. This makes the use of an acreage response model particularly appropriate for an analysis 
of South African maize farmers 
There is a substantial literature, especially from the United States, which looks at determinants of 
acreage response under uncertainty. Acreage response models are popular due to the fact that the 
acreage planted is one of the few factors over which farmers have complete control. Actual supply is 
too dependent on weather conditions and other idiosyncratic factors related to yields, making it 
unsuitable for the study of farmers' decisions. 
One of these models, developed by Chavas and Holt (1990), attempts to close the gap between 
theoretical and empirical findings using acreage response. Chavas and Holt (1990) set up a 
theoretical model in which a farming household maximises its expected utility based on adaptive 











from non-farm income (or wealth) and from uncertain farming profits, the uncertainty being due to 
unknown future prices and yields at the time of planting. The paper shows that the optimal acreage 
decision depends on wealth, expected profits and the variance of profits. 
Using a condition from Chavas and Pope (1985), Chavas and Holt (1990) manage to establish that 
under risk neutrality or, more generally, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) the optimal acreage 
decision function is homogenous of degree zero in input and output prices, but that this condition 
breaks down once any other form of risk aversion is imposed. They also claim that, under risk 
neutrality, the optimal decision function does not depend on wealth or the variance of income4 . 
Hence, if it can be shown that the optimal decision function does depend on either one or both of 
these factors, the farmer's behaviour deviates from that of risk neutrality. They make no specific 
mention of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) as part of this discussion, but we can infer that 
if both wealth and variance affect the optimal decision function, then we have DARA. 
To test these theoretical findings Chavas and Holt (1990) take a first-order Taylor approximation of 
the unknown acreage response function. They then use an expression (similar to the Slutsky 
equation) to estimate the coefficient of a wealth compensated change in expected profits. They 
estimate this econometric model using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for corn and 
soybeans on the basis of which they reject the null hypotheses of risk aversion and CARA for both 
crops. 
Jordaan and Growe (2007) have shown, using a survey of fifty maize farmers in the Valhaarts region, 
that less risk averse and more educated farmers are more likely to adopt the use of forward 
contracting. Ueckermann et al (2008) came to a similar conclusion from their sample of fifty Grain 
SA registered maize and wheat farmers. Such observations suggest that many farmers perceive the 
risks associated with using the futures market to be greater than those in farming itself. The idea of 
subjective uncertainty raised by Simon (1959) is clearly an issue. 











The main downside of these papers is that there is no indication of how farmers use hedging 
instruments to react to different scenarios in different years and how this affects their actual farming 
decisions. While they provide valuable information as to the characteristics of the farmer who is 
willing and able to use hedging instruments, this paper aims to add to their external validity (Roe and 
Just, 2009) by looking more generally at how farmers have changed their farming decisions over the 
years, while attempting to take into account provincial heterogeneities. 
Wu and Adams (2002: 58) claim that the use of aggregate data is a better forecaster of acreage 
response than micro-level data, but that micro-level data is better for studying the impact of site 
specific factors5 . Given that our data is region-specific and that the inferences we are trying to make 
are also region-specific, our choice of data type is appropriate and will allow our analysis to 
complement those of Jordaan and Growe (2007), Ueckermann et al (2008) and Woolverton and 
Skyuta (2009). 
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based on expected prices and expected yields. (1 = (0'1'"'' O'n)9 is the variance-covariance matrix lO of 
profits. f is the expected price and w is wealth. 
A* (w, 'ii, (1, f) is homogenous of degree zero in Cw, p, C, f) for all risk preferences expressed by U (.). 
However, as is shown by Pope (1988: 120), homogeneity of degree zero in output and input prices 
only is not assured and will depend on risk preferences. This is due to the wealth term, since, ceteris 
paribus. an equal increase in input and output prices (leaving profit unchanged) may affect the 
optimal choice of acreage. This means that the classical production theory result of optimal decisions 
depending only on input output price ratios does not apply for all preferences (Chavas and Holt, 1990: 
530). 
Recall the three hypotheses this paper investigates. The first corresponds to risk aversion and DARA; 
if farmers' decisions are affected by the variance of profits, we can say that they are risk averse and, 
furthermore, according to Chavas and Holt (1990) positive wealth effects imply DARA II. The 
second relates to price discovery, which can be analysed by looking at how the expected price affects 
optimal decisions. Finally is that of price risk management. which can be analysed by looking at the 
role the expected price plays in reducing the effect of variance on optimal decisions. While we need 
to wait for the empirical model to be able to test our specific hypotheses, the model we have set up 
and are about to elaborate on will give us an indication of what results to expect, while also providing 
theoretical support for them. 
To the end of establishing homogeneity conditions of the optimal acreage response function under 
uncertainty. Chavas and Holt (1990) combine their first-order conditions with condition (3) below 
derived by Chavas and Pope (1985) from the nullity conditions of the Lagrangian. which holds for all 
risk preferences. 
9 Chavas and Holt (1990) use (J to denote the variance instead of (Jz as is usually done. We follow their 
notation. 
10 By only including the variance of profits and not any higher moments, we have implicitly assumed that the 
variance of profits is normally distributed since the normal distribution is fully characterized by its first two 
moments. 











(3) aA' (ag(A)) _ aA' (ag(A)) A = 0 arr aA aw aA 
This is essentially a special case of the Slutsky equation for factor demand. The first term is the 
substitution effect due to a change in expected profits, while the second is an income effect. 
Substituting in for (a~~A)) and E (;~) from (I) and (2), respectively we obtain the following 
expression l2 
(4) 
aA' _ aA' _ --=- Cn - fECf - p)) - - Cn - fECf - p))A = 0 arr aw 
where 
cov( (PY-C),~~) 
f = ---,---'--.,----'--- for Cov ({ - p), ;~) * II (a~~h)) 
cov( (J_P)';~)_/I(a~~h)) 
Assume diminishing marginal utility of wealth (i.e. that U'O > Oand U''C) < 0). For constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and, more specifically, risk neutrality, we have that r = 0 and 
aA' - = 0 (Chavas and Holt, 1990: 531), reducing (4) to aw 
(5) aA' - a =n = arr 
This demonstrates that under CARA preferences (assuming no other wealth effects) the acreage 
response function is homogenous of degree zero in input and output prices. That is if, p and care 
increased by the same factor, optimal acreage will not change. If, however, we allow for non-CARA 
preferences this need not be the case. 
If E(f - p) = 0, then risk aversion no longer plays a role in optimal decisions since r (which is 
where risk aversion is accounted for via the covariance between marginal utility and profits) will then 
have no impact on the optimal decision. 











However, oA" > 0, which Chavas and Holt (1990) interpret as DARA may have an effect. If risk ow 
aversion is not affecting optimal decisions then it is impossible for the farmer to have DARA 
preferences. Therefore, these positive wealth effects must certainly be due to a factor distinct from 
DARA. Nevertheless, we can say that an efficient futures market is a sufficient price risk 
management tool regardless of individual preferences. 
If we assume that the expectation of future spot prices depends on the individual's information set, we 
have E[pllll. This means that some farmers may believe the futures price is an underestimate and 
others may believe it is an overestimate (i.e. E[pl/tJ *- f). This will affect their decision to hedge or 
speculate, either through the futures market itsel f or by planting more or planting less. 
The "magnitude" of this decision will depend on gamma (i.e. risk preferences). Diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth means that Cov (Cpy - c), :~) and Cov ( (f - p), :~) are negative. If farmers hold 
a short position, Jl (O;~h)) will be positivel 3, making r > O. If, however. farmers speculate by taking 
a long position and Jl (O;~h)) becomes sufficiently negative then it is possible that r> O. For 
farmers to take a long position, their expectations of the future spot price would need to be higher than 
the futures price (E[pl/tJ > f). This means that E(f - p) and r will always have opposite signs 
and, hence, the rECf - p) term will always be negative. The significance of this result is that we 
only need two conditions to hold for an increase in acreage due to an increase in expected profits to be 
less than under full certainty: firstly, we require farmers to be risk averse and secondly. we need their 
individual expectation of future spot prices to be different from that represented by the futures price. 
Hence, we only need for one of these conditions not to hold for the acreage response to be the same as 
under full certainty. The implications of this result for our second and third question will be discussed 
below. 
These results can give us some guidance for interpreting the results from our econometric estimation. 
With respect to the first question, we have found that, for a given level of expected profits, a risk 











averse farmer will plant less than a risk neutral farmer. Furthermore, a farmer with DARA 
preferences (or any other positive wealth effects) will plant less. Therefore, if we find that variance 
has a negative effect on acreage, farmers must be risk averse. Furthermore, if at the same time, 
wealth has a positive effect on planting, farmers exhibit DARA (or other positive wealth effects). 
We can say that the further a risk averse farmer's expectations are from the expected price, the less 
they will plant, meaning that an increase in the expected price may not increase optimal acreage if the 
farmer's expectation is higher. This would mean that farmers should respond more positively to an 
increase in the "voorskut" than an increase in the futures price since it is more closely aligned to the 
future spot price. Also, this means that, if we were to find that farmers planted less after an increase 
in the expected price that it was due to fact that their individual expectation of the price is higher. 
However. this result could also be indicating perverse supply response. This means that inferences 
from the results regarding price discovery (our second question) will always have an element of 
conj ecture. 
Regarding price risk management (our third question), we can say that an efficient futures market is 
sufficient to allow farmers to mitigate risk completely if farmers can enter into a futures contract to 
counter their long or short planting position. 











v Econometric Model 
We take a Taylor first-order approximation of the optimal acreage function A*(w, if, (J,!), which 
gives 
(6) A - aAil "n aAil - "n "n aAIl "n aAil f ilt - ai + -a Wl,t-1 + £...j=l a-. Trjlt + £"'k:;,j £...j -a -.- (Jjlkt + £...j=l -at jlt 
w 1fJ/ rrJ/k J/ 
Where AUt is the acreage planted to crop i by individual I during year t 
This extends equation (9) in Chavas and Holt (1990) to include a futures price and allow for the fact 
that acreage decisions are allowed to vary between individuals. 
. . aA C aA' aA' , 
USing the standard productIon theory result that arr = aff - aw . A' (Mas-Collel et aI, 1995: 7 I), 
which applies for all risk preferences and letting f3ilj = aa;' where A C is the wealth compensated 
acreage decision, (6) becomes 
A - ( "n A - ) "n f3 - "n "n aAil "n aAil f (7) ilt - ai + au Wl,t-1 + £...j=l jlTrjlt + £"'j=l iljTrjlt + £...k:;,j £...j arrj/k (Jjlkt + £...j=l atj jt 
Futures prices have no I subscript due to the fact that available futures prices are the same for all 
farmers (ignoring location differentials). The expectation and variance of profits, however, depend on 
yields and costs, which do differ between farmers. 
Equation (7) applies to a situation where farmers have the choice of planting several crops. We 
restrict ourselves to a single crop, which means that the acreage response for a particular crop is not 











To be able to test the respective effects of yield and price variance, the O"lt term can be decomposed 
into a variance in prices O"i and a variance in yields, O"rr. There is no straight-forward expression for 
the variance of the product ofrandom variables, but it is shown in the Appendix that '4 
Intuitively, this tells us that a variation in yield has a lower effect on profits for a lower mean price. 
As an extreme example, a variation in yield will have no effect on profits if the price is zero and vice 
versa. This means that it is difficult to decipher whether a rise in the variance of profits is due to a 
higher variance in yield or price or merely a greater impact of the same variation due to higher 
expected yield or price. This demonstrates the point made several times during the literature review; 
accounting for price instability is not sufficient to secure income stability. 
The empirical issue, though, is entering this expression into equation (8) so that we may see the 
relative impacts of yield and price variation. From the following we will see the importance of the 
interpretation of the coefficients that the Taylor expansion allows. We focus on the aaA/ O"/t coefficient 
CT/ 
from equation (8). In the Appendix we show that 
(9) 
Substituting this into equation (8) gives us the following 
This equation provides a basis for us to answer our three questions empirically. 
14 This assumes independence of yields and prices since the yields of one farmer will not influence the price can 
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To get this into Rand terms and to distinguish between the values of a hectare of land in different 
regions, we multiply this average farm size by the gross income of maize production in that region. 
Table I shows the mean wealth over the sample period for the four regions. It is clear to see that the 
Cape provinces and K wazulu Natal are far less wealthy than the other regions. This is as expected 
since most commercial maize farming occurs in regions 2 and 4, while maize farmers in regions I and 
3 are likely to be small-scale farmers. This indicates that the differences in wealth between regions 
are more likely to affect our results than changes in wealth over time. 





Table 1. Mean Wealth per RegIOn (Source: Own calculations from various issues of the Census of 
Commercial Agriculture) 
Producer prices for the entire sample are obtained from the 2009 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. 
Expected prices or "voorsko(" prices for the period 1971 to 1996 are also obtained from this source. 
From 1997 onwards the expected price is the average of the July (harvest time) futures price during 
October, November and December (planting time), data for which is obtained from SAFEX. This 
method of calculating the expected price is used by others including Choi and Heimberger (1993). 
All price data is assumed the same for all regions. All prices are the average of the yellow maize and 
white maize prices. The effect of the expected price changing from the "voorskot" to the futures 
price is clear to see from Figure 2. While the mean level of this expected price appears similar pre-
and post-I 996, the interseasonal variance seems greater. Figure 2 a Iso shows the fundamental 
difference between the "voorksot" and the futures price. Pre-1996 the producer price is always equal 
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Once all calculations have been done, we are left with a panel where N=4 and T=35. The next section 











VII Panel Data Techniques 
Our panel is relatively long (T=35, N=4) so its characteristics are different to microeconomic datasets, 
where the N dimension is much larger or many macroeconomic datasets (like the Penn World Tables), 
where the dimensions are roughly equal in magnitude. This is important due to the fact that many 
panel data techniques are unsuitable for a panel of this nature. 
We start our econometric analysis with the standard tixed effects regression 
While the ul term allows us to account for unobservable province-specific effects, which may 
otherwise cause heteroscedasticity, the Vlt may violate the assumption of no serial correlation due to 
serially correlated omitted variables or transitory variables whose effects last more than one period 19 
(Hsiao. 2003: 57). This is an issue in long panels, so we look at ways to test for serial correlation and 
account for it if necessary. 
The simplest and most intuitive test for serial correlation is described by Wooldridge (2002: 275). He 
suggests finding the residuals from the fixed effects regression and running pooled OLS of these 
residuals on their lagged value. This entails running the following regression 
If P is deemed to be significant (using a standard t-test with robust standard errors), serial correlation 
may be present. Wooldridge (2002: 275) states that this is not an optimal test for AR( I), but that it 
can be good enough to indicate a problem. 
We can, therefore, also test to see whether the residuals for each panel have symptoms of 
autocorrelation. We can do this by looking at the correlogram and Q-statistics. 












If we do find evidence of serial correlation, Wooldridge (2002: 275-276) suggests using a robust 
asymptotic variance matrix, but reminds us that its use is only valid for T small relative to N so it is 
not appropriate here. 
An alternative is to include one or more lags of the dependent variable as a regressor as per Nerlove 
C 1979). If serial correlation is being caused due to the fact that the dependent variable is an ARC I) 
this should remove the problem. This approach may lead to an inconsistent estimator due to Nickell 
bias (Nickell, 1981), but this becomes negligible for panel datasets where T is relatively large 20 
(Arellano, 2003: 86). 
Once this technique has been attempted, we can use the same methods described above to test whether 
serial correlation has been cured. If we can say, with some degree of confidence, that it has then we 
can move on to draw inferences without the overconfidence that we may have had if we had ignored 
serial correlation. If not. we may need to include another lag to better account for serial correlation. 
Another approach is to use an autoregressive fixed effects model, which makes adjustments for 
potential autocorrelations. For a known p we can make the following transformation 
Ylt - PYl,t-l = a(l - p) + (Xlt - pXl,t-l)!31 + (Qt - pQt-l){33 + uI(l - p) + CIt 
Notice that the residuals for this model are serially uncorrelated. Equivalently, Baltagi and Li C 1991) 
claim that pre-multiplying a model with AR( I) errors by a matrix C can transform it into one with 
serially uncorrelated errors where 
(1 - p 2)11z 0 0 ... 0 0 
-p 1 0 ... 0 0 
c= 0 -p 1 ... 0 0 
0 0 -p'" 
1 0 
0 0 o ... -P 1 











Using the inverse of the covariance matrix of the transformed errors and initial estimates for p21, the 
model can be estimated using Generalised Least Squares (GLS). 
We now apply these techniques to equation (10) and variations thereof. 
21 The -xtregar- command in Stata gives many options for estimating this autocorrelation. We will use the 











VIII Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the results of estimations conducted using a standard fixed effects regression as well as 
two models which attempt to account for serially correlated errors; one includes a lag of the 
dependent variable and the other is autoregressive fixed effects regression as explained above. The 
results are in columns (I )-(3). Columns (4)-(7) present additional specifications using the two models 
accounting for serial correlation. 
The t-statistics for p in the Wooldridge (2002) test developed above are shown in Table 2. This figure 
for regression (1) indicates that there may be serial correlation. Once the lag is included in 
regressions (2), (4) and (6) we see that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Table 4 in the Appendix shows the p-values for the Q-statistic (Portmanteau test statistic for white 
noise). We can conclude that the Q-statistic is significant for all panels for regression (1) and 
insignificant in all panels except panel 1 for regressions (2), (4) and (6). 
Of course these tests are uninformative for the autoregressive fixed effects regression since it, by 
design, assumes serially correlated errors. However, the Baltagi-Wu (1999) LBI statistic reported in 
Table 2 indicates the validity of using this regression technique. While critical statistics for this test 
are hard to find (Baltagi and Wu, 1999: 822), our LBI statistics are all close to zero indicating positive 
serial correlation in a similar manner to the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
We conclude that including the lag of the dependent variable or using an autoregressive fixed effects 
regression solve the problem of serial correlation satisfactorily. 
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F for variances and 
18.67083*** wealth jointly 
equal to zero 
F for variances 
jointly equal to 7.191835*** 
zero 
F for equal ity of 3.961746** 
variances 
Standard errors in parentheses 









































± Wooldridge (2002) p values in columns (1),(2),(4) and (6); Saltagi-Wu (1999) LSI statistic in 
columns (3),(5),(7) 











Table 2 (continued) 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
At At At At 
At- 1 0.643*** 0.652*** 
(0.0546) (0.0531) 
w t - 1 + Ant 2.40e-06* * * 2.86e-06*** 2.37e-06*** 2.8ge-06*** 
(3.53e-07) (2.80e-07) (3.46e-07) (2.80e-07) 
rr t 14.74 -29.65 10.34 -48.38 
(34.70) (44.97) (30.66) (43.51) 
(JP 
t -1.522* -1.281 * -1.748** -1.509** 
(0.855) (0.682) (0.799) (0.611 ) 
(JY 
t -35,501 ** -17,997 -37,152** -21,599* 
(17,525) (12,526) (17,333) ( 12,418) 
ft -53.61 115.0 33.76 234.9* 
(124.7) ( 138.0) (72.30) (12l.1) 
f· D97 61.26 11.03 -53.06 -131.3* 
(166.0) (142.7) (44.35) (72.65) 
(JP • D97 t 1.109 1.380* 1.240 1.438** 
(0.906) (0.775) (0.869) (0.638) 
D97 -73,154 -72,205 
( 131,305) (141,759) 
t -2,212 -12,498* 
(2,941 ) (7,194) 
a 158,944 792,466*** 40,530 382,551 *** 
( 163,943) (41,258) (84,853) (22,062) 
F for no FE 2l.66*** 47.07*** 2l.94*** 43.17*** 
Serial correlation 
0.119 0.589+ 0.0418 0.550' 
statistic~ 
F for variances and 
21.05963*** wealth jointly 40.38383*** 21.89452*** 43.41362*** 
equal to zero 
F for variances 
jointly equal to 4.264101 ** 3.171624** 5.828477*** 5.288253*** 
zero 
F for equality of 4.103206** 2.06391 4.593795** 3.024629* 
variances 
F for 
(JP + (JP . D97 1.256328 0.07236 2.158951 0.047912 t t 
=0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1 
, Wooldridge (2002) p values in columns (1),(2),(4) and (6); Saltagi-Wu (1999) LSI statistic in 
columns (3),(5),(7) 











Regression (1) is an estimate of equation (10). Given the presence of serial correlation in this 
regression we ignore it. Regression (2) and (3) remove serial correlation using the two techniques 
described. Regressions (4) and (5) include a dummy variable for 199722 indicating the withdrawal of 
the Maize Board, a time trend as well as interactions between the dummy and expected prices and the 
dummy and price variance to allow us to test for changes in the price discovery and price risk 
management functions (questions two and three). These regressions have few significant t-statistics 
yet high R2 values, which is often an indication of multicollinearity. To mitigate this, we drop the 
time trend as well as the 1997 dummy, leaving us with regressions (6) and (7). While we do refer to 
the other regressions in the analysis to follow, we primarily consider regressions (6) and (7). 
The fixed effects regressions all have highly significant F -stats for the presence of panel heterogeneity 
and, hence. our use of a fixed effects regression is justified23 . We have now accounted for region 
specific factors, which are difficult to measure explicitly. The most obvious of these factors would be 
the differences in growing conditions between the regions. 
All coefficients have the likely signs in all regressions, except expected profits and expected prices, 
which are mostly insignificant. This indicates the possibility of perverse supply response mentioned 
in the literature review24 . 
While both yield and price variances are mostly significant. we can see that the magnitude of yield 
variances is higher than that of price variances. To verify that this is not just an illusion of scale we 
test for the equality of the respective coefficients. The F -stats are reported in Table 2 and are 
significant at the 5% level for regression (7) and at the 10% level for regression (6). This indicates 
22 While the Maize 80 ard was withdrawn in 1996, the first SAFEX determined expected price was for the 
1996/1997 season. 
23 A Random Effects model yielded a rho value of zero meaning that it is unsuitable for our dataset. 
24 Our calculation of costs may be also influence our results with respect to expected profits. A It hough logically 
sound. the index used to create a time series for the diflcrent panels was a national one. which also did not take 











that farmers' decisions are more responsive to yield risk than price risk; a result we would not have 
been able to see without distinguishing between the two variances"5• 
We can now begin to attempt to answer the three questions established earlier. According to Chavas 
and Holt (1990) testing for risk aversion is equivalent to testing the joint linear hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the wealth term as well as on the variance terms are zer026 versus the alternative that 
one of these coefficients is different from zero27. If we can reject risk neutrality, Chavas and Holt 
(1990) claim that testing the null hypothesis of the wealth term coefficient equal to zero is equivalent 
to testing for CARA. The F-stats for the first test for all seven regressions are highly significant as 
can be seen in Table 2, while the wealth term is also significantly positive, meaning that. if we were to 
use Chavas and Holt's (1990) approach we would conclude that South African maize farmers exhibit 
DARA preferences. 
We argue that this sequence of tests is somewhat flawed. It is possible to reject the null hypotheses 
due to only wealth being significant, which does not necessarily imply DARA. For example, we 
know that commercial maize farming has substantial economies of scale. Since the way we have 
calculated wealth takes into account the size of the average maize farm, this term may be informing us 
of economies of scale rather than DARA. 
To ensure that we are not just capturing these effects, it makes sense to test the joint significance of 
the variance terms only to test for risk aversion. If we can reject risk neutrality in favour of risk 
aversion then we can test the significance of the wealth term to test for CARA. While we can still not 
be absolutely sure that a rejection of the null hypothesis of the wealth term coefficient equal to zero 
implies DARA, it is at least possible if we have already rejected risk neutrality. However, if we 
cannot reject this null hypothesis after rejecting that of risk neutrality we can comfortably conclude in 
favour of CARA. 
2; Perhaps this is technically incorrect due to the fact that the test has two-sided alternative. but take the liberty 
nonetheless. 
26 . aAI aAI 
I.e. Ho: U 1 = - = ----y = 0 au p aUI 
27 They do not explicitly mention this alternative, but it is implicit for alljoint hypotheses. Logically, to prove 











Nevertheless, the policy implications of finding positive wealth effects should not depend on what we 
decide to call them; farmers will respond positively to an increase in wealth no matter what we decide 
to interpret this term as. Table 3 summarises our possible conclusions for different results of our 
sequence of tests. Our findings correspond to the top-left cell. 
Table 2 also shows the F -stats for the null hypothesis that the variance terms are jointly equal to zero. 
These F -stats are significant at at least the 5% per cent level for all regressions except for regression 
(3) where it is only significant at the 10% level. Given that the coefficients on these terms are 
negative, we can conclude that farmers are risk averse. Given, significantly negative wealth terms, we 
can also conclude that farmers exhibit DARA preferences, keeping in mind our earlier caveat. 
Table 3 





Do not reject 
Ho: Wealth term insignificant 
Reject Do not reject 
(positive coefficient) 
Risk averse and DARA Risk averse and CARA 
and/or non-DARA 
wealth effects 
Risk neutral and Risk neutral 
significant non-DARA 
wealth efTects 
Having addressed our first question, we can now look at how farmers' responses to price discovery 
(our second question) and price risk management (our third question) have changed since the Maize 
Board's withdrawal. We have already established that it is difficult to conclude that farmers respond 
significantly to expected prices, but to see how this has changed once the Maize Board was withdrawn 
(and the expected price changed from the "voorskot" to the futures price) we need to look at the 
ft . D97 term. 
The negative coefficient on the ft' D97 term in regressions (6) and (7) indicates that the expected 
price derived from the futures price is not as effective a price discovery mechanism as was the 
"voorskot". However, it is hard to reject the null hypothesis that farmers responded equally to the 
"voorskot" as they did to the futures price (at best, we can only do so at 1 0% significance in column 











indicating a negative response to expected prices post-1996. The caution shown when dealing with 
price discovery is, therefore, warranted; there are so many complicating factors that it is difficult to 
make inferences based on the expected price. Our conclusion with respect to price discovery, 
therefore, is that farmers show little evidence of farmers responding positively to expected prices and 
that there is little evidence to suggest this has changed since the withdrawal of the Maize Board. 
We saw from Figure 2 in the Data section that price risk has increased post-I 996. From our 
econometrics, the interaction term erf . D97shows some evidence that farmers have changed their 
reaction to price risk since the withdrawal of the Maize Board. Its positive coefficient shows that past 
deviations from the expected price have affected farmers' decisions less post-1996. This essentially 
means that price risk has affected farmers' decisions less since the introduction of SAFEX. 
To test whether the introduction of SAFEX has improved farmers' ability to manage risk, we can test 
whether the coefficients on the respective terms add up to zero. F -statistics for this test are displayed 
in Table 2 and it is clear to see that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the introduction of 
SAFEX has not eliminated price risk. So, we can say that, while the withdrawal of the Maize Board 
has resulted in an increase in price risk, the existence of SAFEX has allowed farmers to deal with this 
risk so that it does not adversely affect their optimal planting decisions. This result is robust across 
specification and estimation method. 
Before we move onto our conclusion and discussion of policy implications we need to make an 
important note. Throughout this discussion we have implicitly made use of the ceteris paribus 
assumption. Most importantly, we have assumed that farmers' subjective uncertainty has remained 
relatively unchanged. That is to say that the attitude farmers had towards risk in 1971 is exactly the 
same as their attitude in 2008. While this is not completely unreasonable, the cultural and political 
changes that have happened in South Africa over this period are substantial and may have changed 
risk attitudes as a result. 
In this section we have tried to answer our three questions empirically. We can conclude that farmers 











did not seem to respond to both the "voorskot" and the futures price. Finally, we found robust 













We have developed a model to test the impact of the deregulation of the maize industry on planting 
decisions made by South African farmers and empirically tested the model using an aggregate data 
panel across four regions of South Africa. Our main findings are that South African maize farmers 
are risk averse and exhibit positive wealth effects, which is consistent with DARA preferences, and 
that the introduction of SAFEX has reduced farmers' acreage response to risk. 
The result with respect to the price risk management function performed by SAFEX is certainly one 
that will please advocates of the free market; while we noticed a distinct increase in the volatility of 
prices after the withdrawal of the Maize Board our results indicate that the presence of SAFEX has 
helped to nullifY this effect. This is in line with the claims made by UNCTAD (2007), which we set 
out to test. 
While this result is encouraging, combining it with the finding of positive wealth effects allows for 
profound policy implications. Assuming that these positive wealth effects are equivalent to DARA, 
we can say that poor farmers are affected more by risk than wealthy farmers. Even if this result is not 
due to DARA, given that it is obtained from the maximisation of expected utility, an increase in 
wealth can at least counteract the effect ofrisk on utility. 
Therefore, any form of wealth transfer to farmers will decrease their risk aversion (i.e. decrease their 
disutility from risk). In terms of the way we have defined wealth in our analysis, this could be in the 
form of land redistribution or an increase in the productivity (value) of land. Besides, it is likely that 
poorer farmers have inferior access to futures markets than rich farmers to account for this risk. 
Together with bctter access, poorer farmers need to be educated in the use of futures markets, thereby 
reducing the subjective uncertainty associated with them. 
While these recommendations are fraught with political. cultural and economic complications, we can 











disadvantages, but that does not take away from the fact that wealth and access to hedging instruments 
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The variance o(the product o(two independent random variables 
It can be shown that 
(A I) Var(X·Y) = Var(X) ECY) + Var(Y) ECX) 
E(X·Y) E(X) E(Y) 





<lIt V ar(py/)+Var(c/)- 2Cov(py/,C/) 
E(p)E(y/) E(p)E(y/) 




Substituting (A I) into (A4) we get 
p y 
(AS) <lIt -~EC )+~EC) 
E(p)E(YI) - E(p) YI E(YI) P 
Or, 
Decomposing the VaAl (Jlt term 
<l/ 
From (A6) we have 
(A 7) 
Using the Chain Rule, 
(A8) 













Q-statistic (Portmanteau test statistic for white noise) Test Results 
Table 3 
p-value for p-value for p-value for p-value for 
Q-stat Q-stat Q-stat Q-stat 
( 1 ) (2) (4) (6) 
Region 1 5.56£-08 0.007729 0.000313 0.000623 
Region 2 5.20E-06 0.079933 0.175874 0.066805 
Region 3 0.000441 0.383054 0.360121 0.126724 
Region 4 1.70E-08 0.855749 0.889233 0.894843 
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